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REFERENCES TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT BRIEF 
All statements heretofore made in Plaintiff-Appellant's 
Brief as to Nature of Case, Disposition in Lower Court, Relief 
Sought on Appeal, Statement of Facts and Argument are hereby 
incorporated or it is intended that the following Arguments be 
added and made a part of said brief by incorporation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT MAY PROPERLY OVERTURN THE FINDINGS AND 
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT IF IT FINDS THE EVIDENCE 
TO BE INSUBSTANTIAL OR INCONSEQUENTIAL AND MAY FIND FOR 
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Defendant-Respondents under Point I of their brief, on 
pages 4-8, would have the law be interpreted that any evidence 
supporting the finding of the trial court is sufficeint. 
Beginning on page 6, the brief reads: 
"There is substantial evidence in the record to support 
these findings." 
Thereafter the few sparse statements of the Defendant's 
witnesses and certain correspondence are referred to, including: 
1. Mr. Woodland (General Manager of Defendant, FIFE) 
testimony. 
2. Letter of October 7, 1975 from FIFE to Davis County 
Planning Commission which defendants purport to be 
their Rehabilitation Plan. 
3. Certificate of Occupancy which was issued. 
4. The Commissions permitting the $10,000 bond to lapse. 
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The evidence defendants fail to present is the Planning 
Commission's refusal of the rehabilitation efforts following as 
opposed to their claim that the Commission accepted plans 
submitted prior to the last date of the lease. The evidence 
substantially proves otherwise. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly defined the standard 
governing evidence in support of the trial court's finding. 
rule: 
From the time-honored and universally accepted rule 
that a finding or verdict must be supported by 
substantial evidence, the modifying adjective 
"substantial" has been used advisably to indicate 
a higher degree of proof than just any evidence 
of any kind. The requirement is that the evidence 
must be sufficient in amount and credibility 
that, when considered in connection with the other 
evidence and circumstances shown in the case, would 
justify some, but not necessarily all, reasonable 
minds acting fairly thereon, to believe it to be the 
truth and conversely, if when considered it 
appears to be so plainly unsubstantial or incon-
sequential that the Court is convinced that no jury 
acting fairly and reasonably could so believe it, it 
cannot property be regarded as substantial evidence. 
Utah State Road Commission v. The Steele Ranch, 
5 3 3 p. 2d 8 8 8 ( 19 7 5) 
The following observations are noteworthy about this 
-2-
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(1) The evidence must be substantial in support of a 
verdict or at least a higher degree of proof than just 
any evidence of any kind. 
(2) The evidence which supports the verdict must be 
considered in connection with other evidence. 
(3) If the evidence which supports the verdict is 
plainly unsubstantial or inconsequential so that the 
court is convinced that reasonable minds acting 
reasonably could not so believe it, it cannot properly 
be regarded as substantial evidence and the Court may 
reverse the findings of the trial Court. 
With respect to the judgement of October 23, 1969, there 
are only two questions that must be answered: 
(1) Whether the judgment imposes the duty to comply 
with the requirements of Davis County Planning Commission 
upon termination of the lease. 
(2) Whether Defendant-Respondents did, in fact, comply 
with the requirements of the Davis County Planning 
Commission at that time. 
There is no question but that the answer to the first 
question is in the affirmative because the evidence over-
whelmingly indicates that it is Davis County Planning 
Commission that must determine what Defendant-Respondent's 
duty is and the Court so held in its judgement. (K.38-40) 
Davis County Planning Commission has determined that duty 
as adequately set forth in appellant's brief. If all 
-3-
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evidences could be stripped away except the Memorandum and 
testimony of Glenn Austin and the testimony and correspondencE 
of Joe Moore, the evidence would establish as a matter of law 
that defendants did not comply with Davis County Planning 
Commission requirements. The following statements of "require· 
ments" were made to the defendants by the Davis County Plann~ 
Commission using the findings of Davis County Engineer, H. 
Glenn Austin. 
(1) Water running down the roads, through the area 
have caused considerable erosion. 
(2) On the upper end of the pit on the north side 
there is a sand hill with steeper slopes than the 
Davis County Excavation Ordinance would allow. The 
sand is sliding down the sand hill and there is no 
vegetation starting in the area and considerable 
wind erosion. 
(3) The whole area shows evidence of a need for 
storm drainage control to prevent erosion. 
(4) It would seem that this north sand hill would 
need to be graded down and topsoil placed on it, 
then reseeded with some recommended type of vegeta-
tion. 
(5) Between this gravel pit and the Hall & Gailey 
pit, there is a steep ridge left between the two 
pits. I would suggest that this ridge should be 
graded down, rounded and seeded. 
(6) There is along the north-south line of the 
pit a general area where considerable regrading 
or revegetation is needed. 
(7) One of the big problems, as I see it, for 
the complete rehabilitation of the pit is the 
control of storm drainage water which is in its 
present condition, causing considerable erosion. 
(See P. 23 the Memorandum of Glenn Austin and 
P. 24, the letter setting forth Davis County 
Planning Commission Requirements addressed to 
Mr. Clifford P. Woodland, Fife Rock Products 
Company.) 
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These were foillrl to be the conditions after the defendants 
had performed three (3) days of very minimal rehabilitation 
efforts. 
Even the testimony of the experts, to-wit, Herb Schreider, 
Jim Byrd, Guy Michael R. Alder and Burke O. Clegg, at most can 
be only supportive or descriptive of the damages as found by 
Mr. Austin and the Davis County Planning Commission. Under 
the terms of the Judgement of 1969 and the Stipulation of 
1967, the duty of the defendants is determined by the Davis 
County Planning Commission. That duty was clearly spelled 
out unequivocably and as a matter of law governs the conduct 
of the defendant. These determinations of May 28, 1976 followed 
(i) the termination of the lease, (ii) the minimal excavation 
accomplished on three (3) days in April of 1975 by Mr. Smith 
and should take priority over Mr. Smith's (defendant Fife's 
employee) conclusion that the slopes were reduced to the proper 
steepness. 
What the Defendant-Respondents must produce is some 
evidence to show that the Davis County Planning Commission 
Accepted the rehabilitation efforts of the Respondent-Defen-
dants. Anything short of that would not be adequate evidence 
and Plaintiff-Appellant must prevail as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
KENNETH F. WALTON'S OBLir,ATIONS AND DUTIES TO 
THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE CAUSE OF ACTION HEREIN 
DATE BACK TO MAY 15, 1955. 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendants in their Brief ta}:e a myopic view of the 
scope of Defendant, Kenneth F. Walton's liability. Apparen• 
throughout the whole litigation, Defendants have taken t~ 
view that if they defend only Fife Rock Products and Constn 
tion Company, they will be providing the defense for the De:. 
dant Kenneth F. Walton. The Defendant, Kenneth F. Waltoo, ~ 
effectively defaulted in his own defense. He never at ary 
time appeared in the trial, the lease of May 15, 1955 was 
made part of the evidence (Def. Ex.-1); and the Court foo~ 
3. A lawsuit was had between the parties and the 
court's holding as to the effecting of the lease 
is contained in the "Judgement" contained in the 
evidence. That Kenneth Walton was obligated under 
such lease to "terrace and comply with the planning 
commissions requirements upon the termination of 
the lease." This provision, in the general judge-
ment, continued on the relationship that started in 
1955 and that the obligation of terrace, etc. would 
effect not only the diggings taking place after 
1967 when the stipulation was made or 1969 when the 
judgement was entered, but also dates back to 1955 
when the digging was first begun insofar as Kenneth 
Wal ton is concerned. ( R. 3 8) 
Yet, Defendant-Respondents take the view, that sorneh~ 
Defendants are confined to any obligations that accrued s~ 
the Defendant, Fife, began their operations sometime in lW 
(See page 2 of Defendant-Respondent's Brief). 
POINT III 
THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER DEFENDANT-RE-
SPONDENTS COMPLIED WITH THE EXCAVATION ORDINANCE 
OF 1960, THE STIPULATION OF JULY 7, 1967, THE 
JUDGEMENT OF OCTOBER 23, 1969 AND/OR EVEN WHAT 
DEFENDANTS CALL THEIR REHABILITATION PLAN OF 
OCTOBER 7, 1971 MAY NOT BE SHIFTED FROM THE DAVIS 
-6-
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COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION TO MR. SMITH OR MR. 
WOODLAND. 
The Stipulation and Judgement spell out that it is the 
oavis County Planning Commission that must determine whether 
Defendant-Respondents complied with the standard for rehabili-
tation that would preserve the land from wasting or erosion and 
would be restored to "usefulness and reasonable physical 
attractiveness" . 
. providing protection of the tax base. 
giv(ing) due consideration to the present and future use of 
the land". (P.3,pp.4-5) It is they who must determine if the 
area were left "unsightly" or so that it would "permit stagnant 
water to remain" or whether peaks and depressions had been 
"reduced to a surface which will result in level or gently 
sloping topography. . which will mini~ize erosion due to 
rainfall". 
Defendant-Respondents attemped to endow Mr. Woodland with 
this authority. 
Mr. Woodland inspected the work and in his opinion 
there was full compliance with the Rehabilitation 
Plan given to Mr. Sutton and with the terms of the 
Judgement. Respondant Brief pp. 3-4. 
Mr. Woodland testified that he instructed an 
employee to take a crew to the gravel pit for 
three davs in April, 1975 (T-309, 360) and comply 
with the-Rehabilitation Plan and remove all steep 
slopes and grade them to 1 1/2 to 1 angles of 
repose and that the work was done. (T-362). 
He stated that he inspected the work and there 
was full compliance with the Rehabilitation Plan 
gfven to Mr. Sutton and the terms of the Judge-
ment (T-313). (Emphasis Added) Respondent's 
Brief p.7. 
Again the evidence must show that the Davis County Planning 
Commission, not Mr. Woodland accepted the work performed in 
April, 1975 to "rehabilitate" the premises. This they cannot 
-7 -
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do, because the evidence, as a matter of law, shows that it 
was not acceptible after the study made by the Planning 
Commission on May 28, 1976 (P Exhs. 23 and 24.) 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence supporting the trial court's finding is 
~nsubstantial" in that they rely upon statements by employees 
of defendant, FIFE, and correspondence written to Davis County 
Planning Commission obviously self-serving, even from the 
beginning. They are "inconsequential" in that they fail to 
establish as a matter of law that the rehabilitation efforts 
were accepted by the Commission. 
The time span from 1955 on has not been accounted for 
by defendant, Kenneth F. Walton, who never made any effort to 
defend throughout the trial. He wholly defaulted thereby. 
Defendant's effort to assume the power given by the 
July 7, 1967 Stipulation and the October 23, 1969 Judgment to 
the Davis County Planning Commission is illegal and capricious 
and the Court had no power to grant to said defendants the power 
to determine the extent of their own responsibilities in 
rehabilitating the property in question. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Lyle J. Barnes 
Attorney for Plaintif f-Appella~ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL F. WALTON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
KENNETH F. WALTON and 
FIFE ROCK PRODUCTS AND 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 15552 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case wherein the Plaintiff-Appellant, Lessor of a gravel pit area, brought suit 
against the Defendants-Respondents, the Lessee and operator of the gravel pit, for money 
damages after the expiration of the Lease and the lower Court found no cause for action 
against either Defendant at the conclusion of a three-day trial. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court entered Judgment of "No Cause for Action" in favor of 
Respondents and against Appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the Lower Court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's "Statement of Facts" is so lengthy and so laced with argument and 
unsupported conclusions that Respondents are compelled to controvert it in its entirety. To 
Particularize the areas of disagreement would unduly lengthen this Brief. Therefore, Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respondents submit a separate Statement of Facts as follows: 
On May 18, 1955 Appellant's predecessor in interest entered into a written Lease 
Agreement with Respondent Kenneth F. Walton for a period of ten years with a renewal 
period [Def. Ex. -1). Shortly after the end of the first ten year period a dispute arose 
concerning the renewal and litigation was commenced by Appellant's predecessor in interest 
against Respondent Walton which resulted in a Judgment dated October 23, 1969 [Pltf. Ex, 
-1). The pertinent portion of said Judgment provided in paragraph 1 (g): 
"That upon the termination of said Lease, Defendant shall comply with 
the requirements of the Davis County Planning Commission with respect 
to terracing and will specifically see to it that there are no large caverns or 
holes left upon the premises." 
Subsequent to the Judgment and sometime during 1971, Respondent Fife Rock 
Products and Construction Company began operations in the gravel pit pursuant to an 
agreement with Respondent Kenneth F. Walton [T-316). Many other gravel operators had 
worked in this pit prior to the time Respondent Fife did so. For example, Reynolds 
Construction Company in the 1930's [T-291), Parsons Construction Company [T-42, 43], 
Smedley Construction Company [T-46, T-303) and unnamed others [T-84). Respondent Fife 
never expanded the perimeters of the gravel pit area and those perimeters were the same in 
1975 when they left the pit [T-307, 329). During their years of operation there was an 
on-going and continuous rehabilitation plan being carried out as the work progressed 
[T-314). The Davis County Excavation Ordinance [Pltf. Ex. -3) provides in Chapter 6 that 
the owner or operator of a gravel pit shall submit a Rehabilitation Plan in connection with 
removal of materials. Mr. Woodland, Operations Manager of Respondent Fife, submitted 
such Rehabilitation Plan by letter of October 7, 1971 [Pltf. Ex. -11, T-295) to Rodney 
Sutton, who is now deceased but was then the Davis County Planning Commission 
Director. A Certificate of Occupancy was then approved and issued by the Planning 
Commission as approved by Mr. Sutton [T-297). Following the letter of October 7, 1971. 
Mr. Sutton called Mr. Woodland and asked for some additional material to complement the 
Rehabilitation Plan and Mr. Woodland sent him a sketch of the proposed contours as they 
would exist following the work [Def. Ex. -4, T-299, 300). Mr. Sutton never asked for 
anything additional by way of a Rehabilitation Plan [T-301, 302). Mr. Woodland saw him 
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on several occasions during the following years while he was still Director of the Planning 
Commission. Mr. Moore, the present Planning Director, stated that nothing was done by 
the Planning Commission between December 1971 when the Certificate of Occupancy was 
issued until the Lease of Defendants expired on May 18, 1975 [T-59]. The gravel pit was 
never "red-tagged" or shut down [T-86, 87]. Mr. Moore also stated that the Certificate of 
Occupancy was renewed on October 4, 1973 without objection from the Planning 
Commission [T-95, 96]. Furthermore, he stated that according to the records, his 
predecessor, Mr. Sutton, had apparently accepted the letter of October 7, 1971 and the 
sketch later forwarded to him as an acceptable Rehabilitation Plan [T-97]. The County 
Commission approved issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy on October 13, 1971 subject 
to filing of a $10,000.00 bond [T-97, 98] which bond was filed on November 10, 1971 
[T-370] and which ran for three one-year periods to November 10, 1975 at which time it 
terminated without objection from the Planning Commission or Davis County [T-372, 373]. 
The bond was for the protection of the Davis County Planning Commission [T-375] but no 
demand was ever made on the bond by Davis County or anyone else [T-376]. 
The Planning Commission Director admitted that there was no mention of "terracing" 
in the Excavation Ordinance and that the Ordinance did not allude to revegetation or 
planting, that there were no written rules or regulations of the Planning Commission 
pertaining to terracing, nor were there any rules, regulations, writings or other materials to 
which an operator could refer and there were not now and never had been any written rules 
or regulations pertaining to revegetation, reseeding, or planting [T-78, 79] and that he had 
no authority to regulate gravel pit areas other than as specified in the Excavation Ordinance 
[T-50, 51, 83]. 
Just prior to the expiration of the Lease in 197 5, Mr. Woodland gave instructions to an 
employee, Mr. Smith, [T-309] to take a crew to the gravel pit on April 14, 15, and 16, 1975 
[T-360] and comply with the Jetter of October 7, 1971 and remove all steep slopes and grade 
them to 1 Yz to 1 angles of repose, as required by the Excavation Ordinance, which was done 
[T-362]. Mr. Woodland inspected the work and in his opinion there was full compliance 
with the Rehabilitation Plan given to Mr. Sutton and with the terms of the Judgment 
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[T-313]. Mr. Smith stated that they reseeded all the disturbed area with crested wheat grass 
[T-364, 365] and complied with all of Mr. Woodland's instructions [T-365). Mr. Woodland 
[T-313] and the Planning Director [T-103, 104] both stated that there was no evidence of 
any excavating having been done in a careless, negligent, reckless, deliberately destructive or 
malicious way and, in fact, that the removal met the accepted standards within the County 
and was consistent with the standards of care employed by other operators in the removal of 
gravel in Davis County [T-103, 104, 314). 
Approximately eight months after the expiration of the Lease, the Appellant brought 
suit against the Respondents claiming: 
1. That both Defendants had violated the provisions of paragraph 
1 (g) of the Judgment of October 23, 1969; and, 
2. That, as limited by the pre-trial order, Defendant Fife Rock 
Products and Construction Company had committed waste on 
the premises under the provisions of 78-38-2, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. [R-32) 
The matter was tried to the Court on October 17, 18 and 19, 1977 and the Court issued 
a Memorandum Decision [R-28, A-1) on October 27, 1977 entering a "No Cause for 
Action" in favor of both Respondents. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment implementing the Memorandum Decision were signed and entered on November 
28, 1977. They are set forth in their entirety in the Appendix and were signed following the 
Court's denial of all of Appellant's post-trial Motions [R-44, R-47, A-5, A-11]. It is noted 
that at the hearing on these Motions Appellant withdrew his request for a new trial [R.48). 
Appellant's appeal followed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT 
ARE PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT AND WHEN THE EVI-
DENCE IS VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
RESPONDENTS, AS REQUIRED ON APPEAL, IT IS CLEAR 
THAT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT AND THAT APPELLANT HAS 
FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING ERROR. 
The Constitution of Utah provides in Article VIII, § 9 that on appeal from the district 
courts to the Supreme Court on " ... cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of law 
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alone". This case involves an action at law for money damages and in applying this 
constitutional provision to such cases, this Court has said that in such cases tried before the 
court without a jury, it will examine the evidence only so far as may be necessary to 
determine questions of law, and it will not pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the findings or judgment, unless there is no legitimate proof to support them and in 
no case will the Court determine questions of fact, Lyman v. Town of Price, 63 Utah 90, 
222 P. 599 (1924), Osborn v. Peters, 69 Utah 391, 255 P. 435 (1927), In re Alexander's 
Estate, 104 Utah 286, 139 P. 2d 432 (1943) [citing numerous Utah cases], Sine v. Salt Lake 
Transp. Co., 106 Utah 289, 147 P. 2d 875 (1944), Jespersen v. Deseret News Publishing 
Co., 119 Utah 235, 225 P. 2d 1050 (1951). This Court has even gone so far as to state that it 
was powerless to substitute another evaluation of the evidence for that of the trial court 
where such evidence was conflicting, Pixton v. Dunn, 120 Utah 658, 238 P. 2d 408 (1951). 
There is a presumption that the findings and judgment of the trial court were correct 
and on appeal they must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Respondent and every 
reasonable intendment and inference must be indulged in favor of them; the burden of 
affirmatively showing error is on the Appellant and the judgment and findings of the trial 
court should not be disturbed unless the evidence viewed on appeal compels a finding as a 
matter of law in favor of the Appellant or unless it manifestly appears that the court 
misapplied the law to the established facts, R. C. Tolman Construction v. Myton Water 
Ass'n, 563 P. 2d 780 (1977), Brown v. Board of Education of Morgan County School 
District, 560 P. 2d 1129 (1977), Nyman v. Cedar City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P. 2d 1114 (1961), 
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 465 (1939), Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 
251, 495 P. 2d 28 (1972). 
The trial court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct and will be disturbed only 
when they are shown to be in error by material, uncontroverted evidence, C. G. Horman 
Co. v. Lloyd, 28 Utah 2d 112, 499 P. 2d 124 (1972). Findings of the trial court are regarded 
as prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless it is shown that they are plainly 
erroneous, Burton v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249 P. 2d 514 
0952), Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P. 2d 294 (1954). 
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Respondents will now examine the evidence as it supports the Findings and Judgment. 
With respect to the Judgment of October 23, 1969, it is noted that the lessee was 
required only to " ... comply with the requirements of the Davis County Planning Com-
mission with respect to terracing and will specifically see to it that there are no large caverns 
or holes left upon the premises". 
In this regard, the Court found in Finding Number 7 [A-7) that the " ... letter of 
Fife Rock Products Company of October 7, 1971 and materials subseuqnelty submitted in 
connection therewith must be deemed to have been accepted by the Davis County Planning 
Commission as a 'rehabilitation plan' ". In Finding Number 8 [A-7] the Court found that 
such rehabilitation plan satisfied the standards of the Davis County Planning Commission. 
In Finding Number 9 [A-7] the Court found as indicated by the testimony of Steven Smith 
that all of the lands had been terraced so that there were no slopes greater than 1 Y2 to I 
requirements of the Excavation Ordinance and the area had been planted with seed in 
accordance with the then prevailing custom in Davis County and that such actions fulfilled 
the requirements of the Rehabilitation Plan. 
There is substantial evidence in the record to support these findings. The evidence 
shows that rehabilitation of the area was being carried out as the work progressed [T-314]; a 
rehabilitation plan was submitted by letter of October 7, 1971 [Pltf. Ex.-11 T-295] and a 
Certificate of Occupancy was approved by the Planning Director and issued by the Planning 
Commission [T-97); additional material to complement the Rehabilitation Plan was later 
submitted [Def. Ex.-4, T-299, 300) after which time the Planning Director never requested 
any additional materials during the remaining time of approximately three years that he was 
the Planning Director [T-301, 302) and on October 4, 1973 the Planning Commission again 
renewed the Certificate of Occupancy without reference to any so called Rehabilitation Plan 
and the matter was never discussed by the Planning Commission again until long after the 
Lease in question had expired [T-96]. The present Director of the Planning Commission said 
that the actions of his predecessor were consistent with his predecessor having accepted the 
actions of Respondents as a fulfillment of the requirement to submit a Rehabilitation Plan 
[T-97, 98]; a $10,000.00 bond was filed by Respondents with the Davis County Planning 
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Commission and it was renewed three times and ran to a period approximately six months 
after the expiration of the Lease at which time it terminated without objections from the 
Planning Commission and no claim or demand was ever made on the bond [T-370, 372, 
373, 375, 376]. 
Mr. Woodland testified that he instructed an employee to take a crew to the gravel pit 
for three days in April, 1975 [T-309,360] and comply with the Rehabilitation Plan and 
remove all steep slopes and grade them to 1 Y2 to 1 angles of repose and that this work was 
done [T-362]. He stated that he inspected the work and there was full compliance with the 
Rehabilitation Plan given to Mr. Sutton and the terms of the Judgment [T-313]. Mr. Smith 
testified that he complied with all of Mr. Woodland's instructions [T-365]. Numerous other 
companies other than Respondents have removed gravel from this area dating clear back 
into the 1930's [T-42, 43, 46, 84, 291, 303] and Appellant's own witnesses stated that they 
did not know how, when or by whom any of the alleged erosion had been caused [T-101, 
102, 103, 198]. Appellant's witness, Guy Michael Alder, stated that he had seen a lot of 
erosion occur with a 1 !Ii to 1 slope, which is all that is required by the Excavation 
Ordinance, with which Respondents complied, and that he could not dispute that the 
claimed erosion had occurred after the time Respondents left the area, inasmuch as he had 
never seen the property until a week before the trial and had only seen photographs of it 
taken approximately one and one-half years after the Lease expired [T-235, 246, 247]. This 
witness also stated that he had never seen the procedures which he described in his testimony 
applied to a gravel pit [T-236]; that he had no knowledge of actual customary practices used 
to rehabilitate gravel pits in 1967 or 1969 or at the time of trial [T-249]; that he had 
presented testimony with a goal for establishing a residential real estate development and 
not the rehabilitation of a gravel pit and that his plan exceeded the requirements of the 
Excavation Ordinance and included requirements not even mentioned in such Ordinance 
[T-250, 251] and that the description in the Lease did not cover the same area as his 
proposed study [T-396]. Another of Plaintiff's expert witnesses, Herbert B. Schreider, 
testified that he first became familiar with the property approximately one and one-half 
Years after the Lease expired [T-171 ), and that he did not know when the alleged erosion 
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described in his testimony had occurred [T-198) and that some erosion would occur 
naturally [T-199) and that even that alleged in his testimony could not all be attributed to a 
gravel pit operation [T-199). 
From these excerpts in the record and testimony it is clear that there is substantial 
evidence to support the findings and judgment of the trial court. Appellant may argue that 
the evidence is in dispute. However, this court stated in Cannon v. Wright, 531 P. 2d 1290 
(1975): 
"As we have often reiterated, it is the prerogative of the trial court to 
determine what aspects of the evidence he will believe [citing Child v. 
Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P. 2d, 981: Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 
48 P. 2d 513). This includes that he can be selective and choose 
those portions of the testimony of any witness which he thinks has 
the greater probability of being true.'' 
If the findings and judgment of the trial court are supported by any substantial 
evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, as they are in this case, such 
findings should not be disturbed, Town and Country Disposal, Inc. v. Martin, 563 P. 2d 
195 (1977), Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P. 2d 1142, 1145 (1953). 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment in this case should remain 
undisturbed on appeal. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT WAS NOT IN ANY WAY 
BASED UPON ESTOPPEL AND THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL 
WAS NEVER MENTIONED IN THE PLEADINGS, DURING THE 
COURSE OF TRIAL NOR IN THE FINDINGS OR JUDGMENT 
OF THE TRIAL COURT AND SUCH DOCTRINE IS TOTALLY 
IRREVELANT TO ANY ISSUES PERTAINING TO THIS CASE. 
Appellant has devoted a substantial portion of his Brief to a discussion of the doctrine 
of estoppel under his Points I, II and III. The reasons for his having done so remain 
obscure to the Respondents since the doctrine of estoppel was never set forth in anY 
pleadings, was not disccused at any time during the three day trial, was not mentioned in the 
Courts Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or Judgment, and 
was not ever an issue in the case at any time. 
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Inasmuch as the Appellant had alleged a cause of action based upon waste, which 
Appellant argues is an action in tort, it was necessary for the court to have some grounds 
upon which to determine the standard of care of nature of the duty, if any, which related to 
1uch theory. At the time the concept of estoppel was first argued by the Appellant, which 
was at post-trial Motions on November 28, 1977, the Court stated [Ruling of the Court 
A-13]: 
"The Court rules as follows: 
The Court will rule that the basic issue was not estoppel. The 
basic reason for reviewing the planning commission's past activity 
was to establish some attempt to ascertain what the standard 
was. That's of the day of termination of the lease. 
The Court believes, taking this view, the Motion to be denied. 
Estoppel, in the sense as used by plaintiff's attorney was not in 
issue ever in the trial." 
In his Brief, Appellant has purported to tell us the basis upon which the Court arrived 
at its findings and judgment, claiming such basis to have been estoppel. However, the Trial 
Court itself specifically repudiated this view and told Appellant in open court that estoppel 
was not ever an issue in the trial and that the only reason for reviewing the Planning 
Commission's activities was for the purpose of determining what standard to apply in 
connection with the Appellant's allegations. The standard established by review of the 
Planning Commission's activities, which was only a small part of the entire evidence bearing 
on this subject, convinced the trial court that the Defendants had met such standard and 
that the Plaintiff had "no cause for action" against the Defendants. 
Furthermore, Appellant has related this argument to the question of whether or not a 
"Rehabilitation Plan" was filed, whereas, under Paragraph I (g) of the Judgment of 
October 23, 1969 Respondents were obligated only to comply with the requirements of the 
Planning Commission with respect to "terracing" which the evidence referred to above 
shows they did by grading the land to I Yi to I angles when they left the gravel pit. The fact 
that the Court found that the Respondents had, in fact, submitted a "Rehabilitation Plan" 
and complied with it [A-7] indicates that the Respondents had gone even further than 
1e4uired by the Judgment of October 23, 1969 in meeting and fulfilling their responsibilities. 
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POINT III 
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF 
SHOWING ANY PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND THE FINDINGS 
AND JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT SHOULD BE AF-
FIRMED. 
A. Date of Applicable Standards to be Applied. 
The Lease in question terminated and expired on May 18, 1975. However, in Point JV 
of Appellant's Brief, he seems to be arguing that Respondents did not meet their obligations 
under the October 23, 1969 Judgment and requirements of the Planning Commission with 
respect to terracing or that Respondents are somehow obligated to meet requirements 
established subsequent to the date of the expiration of the Lease. Appellant cites nothing 
from the record in support of this argument which is, in fact, directly contrary to specific 
findings of the Court. In Finding Number 10 [A-7] the Court found that new concepts of 
rehabilitation are now being developed but that they were not generally recognized or 
required by the parties when the Lease terminated and the rehabilitation was completed. In 
Finding Number 14 [A-8] the Court specifically found that " ... the rehabilitation of tht 
lands in this case was in accordance with the then prevailing standards of 1975 in the Davis 
County area and throughout the general area of the Wasatch front and, therefore, also in 
accordance with the Judgment of October 23, 1969". In that same finding the Court al>o 
stated that it did not find that there had been any violation of the law [AS]. 
It appears obvious that Respondents should not be required to conform to an1 
standards which have been developed after the termination of the Lease in question. As a 
matter of fact, however, the evidence did not show that the Planning Commission had ever 
adopted any new rules or regulations after the date of the expiration of the Lease. 
B. Relationship Between Respondents 
In Point V of his Brief, Appellant attempts to make some distinction between at 
assignment and a sublease by referring to the obligations existing between Respondents 
However, the Lease Agreement between Respondents was never received into evidence noi 
was there any testimony pertaining to such relationship. There is, therefore, no support ll 
the record for Appellant's argument. In any event, during motions objecting to propose; 
pre-trial order which were heard on October 13, 1977 (reduced to written Order dat<> 
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October 27, 1977) [R-32], the Court refined the issues of the case by ordering (R-32] that 
any cause of action against Respondent Fife based upon the Judgment of October 23, 1969 
would be derivative from the position of Respondent Walton. Therefore, inasmuch as the 
Court found in Findings Number 12 and 14 [A-7, 8] that evidence showed a compliance 
with said Judgment of October 23, 1969, it is totally irrelevant whether Fife was an assignee 
of the Lease or a subleassee. Either status would result in a "no cause for action" against 
Respondents. 
C. Appellant's Evidence Failed to Show the Commission of Any Waste 
Appellant argues that a cause of action for waste is a cause of action in tort. 
Respondents agree that Waste is a species of tort, 78 Am Jur 2d, Waste, § 1, however, 
Respondents cannot agree that violation of a statutory enactment is one of the elements of 
waste, although violation of statute may be considered as part of the proof. In other words, 
as in any tort action, a duty of care or standard of care must be established and this can be 
done by showing what certain statutory requirements are and/or by showing what the 
generally accepted standards of the community were during the time in question. In this 
case, Appellant has failed to make this distinction and seems to base his claim upon the 
argument that waste per se or as a matter of law has been committed by Respondents 
because they violated the Excavation Ordinance in question. However, the Court 
specifically found '' ... that there is no waste per se proven in this case'' [Finding Number 
11, A-7]; that " ... the mining was lawfully done ... in accordance with the then 
existing law ... " [Finding Number 12, A-7]; that the acts did not support a cause of 
action for waste by the remainderman against a subtenant [Finding Number 13, A-8]; that 
the Court did not find it to have been proven that the surface of the mountain was left in 
violation of law and that . . . "the rehabilitation of the lands in this case was in 
accordance with the then prevailing standards of 1975 ... " [Finding Number 14, A-8]; 
and that "the court does not find it proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
mined area has been returned to the remainderman in a wasted or negligently damaged 
condition" [Finding Number 16, A-8]. In so finding, the Court concluded that 
"Defendants have complied with the Judgment of October 23, 1969 and the Davis County 
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Excavation Ordinance as applied to this situation [Conclusions Number I, A-8] 
Having, therefore, found and concluded that there was no cause of action for waste based 
upon violation of statute or ordinance, the Court was also required to determine, and did 
so, whether or not there was a cause of action for waste based upon violation of any other 
duty or standard. In the process of arriving at a negative answer, the Court found that the 
mining in question was done in accordance with the then prevailing customs and usage 
[Finding Number 11, A-7]; " ... that the standards at the time the mining was done and 
rehabilitation completed were in accordance with the then existing law and judgment of 
October 23, 1969" [Finding Number 12, A-7]; that the mining was done in accordance 
with " ... the prevailing general standards of 1975 in the Davis County area and 
throughout the general area of the Wasatch front ... " [Finding Number 14, A-8]; and 
that the mined area was not returned to the remainderman in a wasted or negligently 
damaged condition [Finding Number 16, A-8]. Therefore, the Court concluded that: 
"The Defendants have not done anything to constitute a nuisance, 
create waste, or leave the property in question in a negligently dam-
aged condition." [Conclusion Number 2, A-8]. 
Therefore, what the Court did was to find and conclude that there was no cause of 
action for waste based upon (1) violation of statute or ordinance, or (2) based upon any 
standard established by custom and usage in the area. 
Appellant has misperceived the purpose for which the Court received evidence and 
made findings and conclusions pertaining to standards, customs, usage and practice of 
removing gravel in the Davis County and Wasatch front areas. This evidence was received, 
and subsequent findings and conclusions made, not for the purpose of showing any 
justification or excuse in connection with the violation of a statute or ordinance, for no such 
violation was found, but for the purpose of establishing whether or not there was any other 
standard or duty quite separate and apart from the Ordinance, which Appellant could show 
had been violated. Once the evidence had been received for the purpose of determining what 
the duty or standard was, the Court then found that Respondents had complied with such 
duty or standard and that there was no commission of waste based upon violation of the 
Ordinance or violation of any standard or duty established by custom and practice. 
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The Appellant has made some reference to portions of the testimony which he alleges 
supported his allegations of waste. Respondents have replied to these points earlier by 
showing that these witnesses did not see the property until a year to one and one-half years 
after the Lease had terminated, could not identify which erosion had occurred naturally, 
could not identify what erosion, if any, was attributable to the Respondents or when any of 
the alleged erosion had occurred. Respondents then went on to show that there was 
substantial evidence in the transcript and exhibits to support the findings, conclusions and 
judgment of the trial court. The most that can be said for the references made by Appellant, 
is that they show that the evidence was not completely undisputed. However, as noted in 
Cannon v. Wright, supra, the trial court can be selective in exercising his prerogative to 
determine what aspects of the evidence he will believe. In this case, while the evidence may 
not be totally undisputed, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings, 
conclusions and judgment of the trial court and, under appellate rules referred to above, 
they should not be disturbed on appeal. 
In connection with the Excavation Ordinance in question, Respondents further note 
that part of the purpose of this ordinance [Pltf. Ex. -3] is declared to be that "these 
provisions are deemed necessary in the public interest to effect practices which will provide 
protection of the tax base (provide for the economical use of the vital materials necessary 
for our economy and give due consideration to the present and future use of land) in the 
interest of promoting the public health, safety and general welfare". By no stretch of the 
imagination can Appellant reasonably argue that under this ordinance the "economical 
use" of "vital materials necessary for our economy" is being promoted by allowing an 
owner to lease his property for the removal of gravel (for which he receives payment) and 
then permitting him to bring suit for damages at the expiration of the Lease. 
In connection with the fact that at the time the Lease was originally made, the property 
was already being used for the purpose of excavating gravel, it is noted that it is a general 
rule that one in the possession of premises under a limited or temporary tenancy may, 
without being guilty of waste, continue to work mines that were open when the tenancy 
commenced on the theory that in such cases mining is a mere mode of use and enjoyment 
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and to extract minerals is merely to take the accruing profits of the land, 78 Am Jur 2d, 
Waste, § 24. In an analogous situation the Restatement of the Law of Property, § 144, 
states: 
"When, prior to the creation of an estate for life, the land in which 
such estate is created has been used by extracting and selling coal, oil, 
iron, sand, clay or other like deposits found therein, or by cutting 
and selling timber located thereon, then the owner of such estate for 
life is privileged to continue the use so begun, although such con-
tinuance causes the market value of the interest limited after the estate 
for life to be diminished." 
In this case, it was most certainly within the contemplation of the parties when the 
Lease for the removal of gravel was negotiated and contracted, that there would be some 
significant and permanent alteration of and damage to the property and that this condition 
would persist and continue when and after the lease expired and the property reverted back 
to the fee owner. Appellant should not now be heard to complain about that which was 
within the contemplation of the parties at the time the Lease in question was made. 
D. There was No Prejudicial Error in Receiving Any Testimony During the Trial. 
In Point VII of Appellant's Brief it is claimed that the Court committed prejudicial 
error in receiving the testimony of Mr. Woodland with respect to a telephone conversation 
which he had with the then Director of the Davis County Planning Commission, Mr. 
Sutton, pertaining to additional materials to complete the Rehabilitation Plan. After 
indicating that he would send the additional materials Mr. Sutton requested, Mr. Woodland 
stated that Mr. Sutton said: 
"In substance, he said, 'that ought to do; that's okay' ". [T-300] 
Mr. Woodland then forwarded a sketch which then became a part of the official files of the 
Planning Commission [T-109, 110] and could have been received into evidence on that basis 
alone. Appellant complains that this Defendant's Exhibit Number 4 [Def. Ex.-4] Wal 
received following the conversation of which Appellant complains. However, the record 
clearly indicates that this Exhibit had already been received into evidence the previous da! 
of trial during the cross-examination of one of Appellant's own witnesses. It was received 
without objection from the Appellant [T-109, 110]. 
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As to the conversation itself as complained of by Appellant, it was a statement made by 
Mr. Sutton contempraneous with his perceiving the event or condition which the statement 
narrates, described or explains, namely, the forwarding of the sketch in question and would, 
therefore, be admissable as a hearsay exception under the provisions of Rule 63 (4) (a) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. Furthermore, inasmuch as Mr. Sutton was charged with the 
duty and responsibility of administering the Excavation Ordinance as the Planning 
Commission Director, his statement that "that ought to do; that's okay" [meaning that the 
rehabilitation plan requirement had been fulfilled,] was a declaration against his interest as 
the Planning Commission Director and admissable as a hearsay exception under Rule 63 
(10) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. In the alternative, Respondents argue that this was not a 
hearsay statement anyway in that it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated 
but only for the limited purpose of explaining why Mr. Woodland did what he did and what 
his frame of mine was in doing what he did. 
Even admitting for the sake of argument that the evidence should not have been 
received it is clear that no prejudice resulted from its having been received. Rule 61 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "Harmless Error" states: 
"No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no 
error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted 
by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new 
trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take 
such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. 
The court at every stage of the proceedings must disregard any error 
or defect in the proceedings which does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties." 
Rule 4, "Effect of Erroneous Admission of Evidence" of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
provides that: 
"A verdict or finding shall not be set aside nor shall the judgment or 
decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admis-
sion of evidence unless (a) There appears of record objection to the 
evidence timely interposed and so stated as to make clear the specific 
ground of objection, and (b) The court which passes upon the effect 
of the error or errors is of the opinion that the admitted evidence 
should have been excluded on the ground stated and probably had 
a substantial influence in bringing about a verdict or finding ... " 
[Italics Added.] 
Under these standards, even if the evidence should not have been received, it is clear 
that Its receipt was not prejudicial for the following reasons: 
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1. Appellant himself argues on page 28 of his Brief that '' ... whether or not a 
rehabilitation plan was submitted is really irrelevant in that it is not probative as to the 
requirements imposed upon the defendant to rehabilitate under the stipulation and 
judgment". 
2. There was already competent evidence received to show that a Rehabilitation Plan 
was submitted and approved: 
a. Mr. Moore, Mr. Sutton's successor, testified that from the evidence in the 
file it appeared that Mr. Sutton had accepted the letter, sketch and other 
materials as a Rehabilitation Plan [T-97]. 
b. The letter of October 7, 1971 was received into evidence [T56, 57). 
c. A Certificate of Occupancy was issued December 3, 1971 [T-59]. 
d. The Certificate of Occupancy was renewed without objection on October 4, 
1973 [T-95, 96; Dec. Ex. -2]. 
e. A $10,000.00 bond was posted on November 10, 1971 following the letter 
of0ctober7, 1971 [T-91]. 
f. A Rehabilitation Plan was never requested again during the term of the Lease 
[T-91, 96]. 
g. On October 13, 1971 the County Commissioners themselves approved a Cer· 
tificate of Occupancy on the gravel pit without reference to a Rehabilitation 
Plan [T-97, 98]. 
h. No claim was ever made on the bond and it was allowed to lapse after the 
Lease expired without any objection from the Planning Commission [T-372. 
373]. 
In view of the fact that there is an overwhelming amount of other competent evidence 
bearing upon the same matter of which Appellant complains, it is clear that if there was any 
error that it was "harmless error" under Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
that it did not have a "substantial influence in bringing about the verdict or finding" under 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and that, therefore, the findings and judgment of the 
trial court should not be disturbed. 
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Appellant goes on to complain about an alleged hearsay conversation pertaining to the 
reasons why the Respondents did not obliterate the road in the gravel pit area. Mr. 
Woodland was asked why he did not instruct his crew to obliterate the road and he stated 
that his reasons were that he had been told that the Appellant did not want the road 
obliterated. The testimony was received not for the purpose of proving the truth of the 
matter as stated, but for the purpose of explaining his reasons for that course of action. It 
was not, therefore, hearsay [T-310]. Appellant again complains that Mr. Smith was allowed 
to testify about what someone else told him concerning Appellant's desire not to have the 
road obliterated. Again, this conversation did not go to the truth of the matter stated but 
was received for the purpose of showing the motivation of Mr. Smith as to why he did not 
order his crew to obliterate the road. The court said that it would: 
and 
"Permit it for that limited purpose. However, it is rejected as far as it 
may imply the Plaintiff actually speaking as alleged" 
"as to why he did what he did, and the way he did it, and his frame 
of mind during the day of work or days of work, that you may offer 
it for that purpose" [T-363, 364). 
In any event, the receipt of this testimony would not have been prejudicial under the 
rules referred to above for the reason that there was other competent evidence bearing upon 
this issue. Mr. Smith testified that he had a direct conversation with Appellant during which 
Appellant told Mr. Smith directly that he did not want the road obliterated and that he 
wanted that road left for access to the spring [T-366). Furthermore, upon cross-examina-
tion, counsel for Appellant elaborated and expanded upon that conversation between Mr. 
Smith and Appellant [T-366, 367). 
As to the objection based upon the Statute of Frauds, Respondents see no merit 
whatsoever to that argument and take the position that the Statute of Frauds is totally 
inapplicable to this case as did the trial Court [T-296, 298, 312) in overruling such 
objections. 
For these reasons it is clear that no prejudicial error resulted from the receipt of any 
1Nimony or evidence in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant brought his complaint based upon two causes of action: 
(1) He alleged that both Respondents were liable to him for violating the provisions of 
Paragraph 1 (g) of the Judgment of October 23, 1969 pertaining to the requirement to 
"terrace" the property at the expiration of the Lease in accordance with the requirements of 
the Davis County Planning Commission; and, (2) That Respondent Fife had committed 
waste upon the property. 
After a full three-day trial, the Court found the facts in favor of both Respondents and 
entered a judgment for no cause for action. Upon Appeal it is presumed that these finding> 
and the judgment are correct and the Appellant has the burden of proving to the contrary. 
In order to do so, it is not sufficient that the Appellant simply show that there was some 
dispute in the evidence. If he is to overcome the presumption in favor of the findings and 
judgment and meet his burden, he must show that there was no substantial evidence in the 
record upon which the trial court could base its findings and judgment. A review of the 
evidence as contained herein shows that there was substantial evidence to support the 
findings and judgment of the trial court and that no prejudicial error was committed during 
the course of the trial and for these reasons and based upon these facts the findings and 
judgment of the trial court should remain undisturbed on appeal and the judgment of no 
cause for action in favor of both Respondents should be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
KING & KING 
WILLIAM H. KING 
FELSHA W KING 
P. 0. Box 220 
251 East 200 South 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
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JN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DA VIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL F. WALTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH F. WALTON, and 
FIFE ROCK PRODUCTS AND 
CONSTRUCTON COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
MEMORAMDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 21341 
The Court has considered at length and deliberated on the evidence presented, the 
briefs submitted, and renders findings of facts and conclusions of law in a general sense 
below. The defense attorney is invited to submit proposed Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law consistent with the general conclusions and outline below. 
GENERAL FINDINGS 
I. Paul Walton and Larene Walton were very close. Paul Walton gave the other a 
quit claim deed and she held his interest in trust and acted for him as trustee from the time 
of the making of the first deed in evidence. Even before the making of such deed, she acted 
for Paul Walton in a fiduciary capacity as well as for herself. 
2. The original lease in question is between Mrs. Walton and Kenneth Walton. Such 
lease is as contained in the evidence. 
3. A lawsuit was had between the parties and the court's holding as to the effecting of 
the lease is contained in the "Judgment" contained in the evidence. That Kenneth Walton 
was obligated under such lease to "terrace and comply with the planning commissions 
requirements upon the termination of the lease." This provision, in the general judgment, 
continued on the relationship that started in 1955 and that the obligation of terrace, etc. 
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would affect not only the diggings taking place after 1967 when the stipulation was made or 
1969 when the judgment was entered, but also dates back to 1955 when the digging was first 
begun insofar as Kenneth Walton is concerned. 
4. That the ordinance in question is contained in evidence and was enacted in 1 
approximately 1960. This ordinance was never enforced insofar as the provisions 
"rehabilitation of lands" were involved, but was enforced as to dust, noise and other 
factors. The Planning commission has never, during the period of time in question, ' 
requested the submission of a rehabilitation plan of any gravel miner, except the defendant 
Fife in this case, and this request was made at the plaintiff Walton's insistence. The request 
was for "something to be put in the file" and was not carefully examined or considered by 
the planning commission, and no action was taken by the planning commission within the 
thirty days allowed by the ordinance to disapprove such plan, and therefore the submitted 
"rehabilitation plan" must be deemed to have been accepted by the planning commission. 
5. Fife "rehabilitation plan" did satisfy the then existing standards and was accepted 
by the planning commission's lack of action after the period of time required by the 
ordinance. Also, the Court accepts the testimony of the witness Smith as true in that when 
he stated that he terraced all of the lands so that there were no slopes greater than the one 
and one-half, and planted seed in accordance with the then prevailing custom in Davis 
County and like areas. That the improved and more detailed concepts of planting and 
rehabilitation of land are now beginning to take hold, but they were not general!: 
recognized or required by participants before the 1955 date when this lease was terminated 
and the rehabilitation completed. 
6. The Court finds that the mining in question was done in accordance with the then 
prevailing customs and useage in the mining field and that there is no waste per se proven in 
this case. The court finds that the mining was lawfully done and that while the area left il 
unpleasant in appearances and might in some future date be deemed to be a nuisance if 
created at a future date, that the standards at the time the mining was done and 
rehabilitation completed were in accordance with then existing law. 
7. The Court recognizes that in a proper case, there is a possible cause of action in th< 
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hands of a remainder-man for waste committed by a sub-tenant. However, in this case the 
Court does not find the facts supporting such a cause of action. 
8. The Court finds that in a proper case, a remainder-man of even an adjoining 
landowner might bring a successful action against a person who created unsightly scars on a 
mountain-side and did not rehabilitate the area so as to comply with the requirements of 
Jaw, and thereby might be guilty of the creation of a nuisance which had a tendency to 
suppress local land values of not only the remainder-man but adjoining land users and 
might be declared an unlawful nuisance. Of course such a theory of action requires that the 
scar on the surface of the mountain be left in violation of law as the law then existed and 
also in violation of the prevailing general standards then in existence. The Court, however in 
this case, does not find that such has been proven, but does in fact find that the 
rehabilitation of the lands were in accordance with the then prevailing standards of 1975 in 
the Davis County area and throughout the general area of the Wasatch Front; and that 
therefore, there is no cause of action under the fact situation here present. 
9. The Court finds no convincing proof that the flooding that has resulted from the 
digging has proceeded outside of the area in which the digging occurred to such an extent as 
to constitute a nuisance or menace to the lands below, unreasonably. 
10. The Court does not find it proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
mined area has been returned to the remainder-man in a wasted or negligently damaged 
condition. 
11. The Court therefore enters a "no cause for action" in favor of both Kenneth 
Walton and Fife Rock Products and Construction Company. 
DATED this 27th day of October, 1977 
JOHN F. WAHLQUIST, JUDGE 
A3 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DA VIS COUNTY 
PAUL F. WALTON, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
KENNETH F. WAL TON and 
FIFE ROCK PRODUCTS & 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 21341 
The above entitled and numbered cause came on for Trial on Monday, Tuesday and 
Wednesday, October 17, 18 and 19, 1977, and the parties herein having waived a jury, said 
cause was tried to the Court before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District Judge, with 
Lyle J. Barnes, Esquire, appearing as attorney for Plaintiff and Felshaw King, Esquire, and 
William H. King, Esquire, appearing as attorneys for Defendants, and after hering the 
allegations and proofs of the parties, and the arguments of counsel, the Court took the 
matter under advisement and the Court thereupon having considered at length and 
deliberated on the evidence presented, the Briefs submitted, and being fully advised herein 
did make and enter a Memorandum Decision dated October 27, 1977 containing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law in a general sense and the said Memorandum Decision finding 
in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff, and the Court having invited the attorneys 
for Defendants to submit Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with the 
general conclusions of the said Memorandum Decision, the Court does hereby make the 
following special Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. These proceedings involved Plaintiff's Complaint for damages from Defendants 
based upon allegations of (1) violations of the terms of a Judgment dated October 23, 1969 
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in a law suit between Lerene Walton and Kenneth F. Walton and (2) as to Defendant Fife 
Rock Products and Construction Company, allegations of waste as defined by statute. 
2. Paul Walton and Lerene Walton were very close. Paul Walton gave Lerene Walton 
a Quit Claim Deed to the property in question and she held his interest in trust and acted for 
him as trustee from the time of the making of the first Deed in evidence. Even before the 
making of such Deed, she acted for Paul Walton in a fiduciary capacity as well as for 
herself. 
3. The original Lease in question was between 0. F. Walton, Lerene Walton's 
predecessor in interest, and Kenneth F. Walton and was dated May 18, 1955. Such Lease is 
as contained in the evidence. 
4. Lerene Walton succeeded to the interest of 0. F. Walton under the Lease of May 
18, 1955 and subsequently a law suit was had between Lerene Walton, Plaintiff, and 
Kenneth F. Walton, Defendant, in the District Court of Davis County, State of Utah, Civil 
Number 11601 and the parties thereto entered into a Stipulation on July 7, 1967 which was ' 
~:: later incorporated into a Judgment dated October 23, 1969 which Judgment is as contained 
: 1 in the evidence. Under that Judgment and particularly Paragraph 1 (g) thereof, Kenneth F. 
~! ,, 
l• Walton was, upon termination of said Lease, obligated to "comply with the requirements of 
the Davis County Planning Commission with respect to terracing" and to see to it that there 
were no large caverns or holes left upon premises. This provision, in the general Judgment, 
continued on the relationship that started in 1955 and that the obligation of terracing, etc. 
would affect not only the diggings taking place after 1967 when the Stipulation was made or 
1969 when the Judgment was entered, but also dates back to 1955 when the digging was first 
begun insofar as Kenneth F. Walton is concerned. 
5. That the ordinance in question pertaining to the requirements of the Davis County 
Planning Commission is contained in evidence and was enacted with an effective date of 
November 10, 1960. This ordinance was never enforced insofar as the provisions 
"Rehabilitation of Lands" were involved, but was enforced as to dust, noise and other 
factors. 
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6. The Davis County Planning Commission has never, during the period of time in 
question, requested the submission of a Rehabilitation Plan of any gravel miner except the 
Defendant Fife in this case, and this request was made at the Plaintiff Walton's insistence 
after the expiration of the Lease in question. 
7. The request was made by the former director of the Davis County Planning 
Commission, now deceased, for "something to be put in the file" and was not carefully 
examined or considered by the Davis County Planning Commission, and no action was 
taken by the Davis County Planning Commission within the thirty (30) days allowed by the 
ordinance to disapprove such a plan, and therefore the submitted Rehabilitation Plan by 
letter of Fife Rock Products Company of October 7, 1971 and materials subsequently 
submitted in connection therewith must be deemed to have been accepted by the Davis 
County Planning Commission as a "Rehabilitation Plan". 
8. The Fife "Rehabilitation Plan" referred to above did satisfy the then existing 
standards and was accepted by the Davis County Planning Commission's lack of action 
after the period of time required by the ordinance as referred to above. 
9. The Court finds as indicated by the testimony of the witness Steven Smith, that 
Defendant Fife terraced all of the lands so that there were no slopes greater than the one 
and one-half to one requirements of the excavation ordinance and planted seed in 
accordance with the then prevailing custom in Davis County and like areas and that such 
actions fulfilled the requirements of the Fife "Rehabilitation Plan" referred to above. 
10. That improved and more detailed concepts of planting and rehabilitation of land 
are now beginning to take hold, but they were not generally recognized or required by 
participants before the date when this Lease was terminated and the rehabilitation 
completed. 
11. The Court finds that the mining in question was done in accordance with the then 
prevailing customs and useage in the mining field and that there is no waste per se proven in 
this case. 
12. The Court finds that the mining was lawfully done and that while the area left is 
unpleasant in appearance and might by some future standards be deemed to be a nuisance if 
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created at a future date, that the standards at the time the mining was done and 
rehabilitation completed were in accordance with the then existing law and Judgment of 
October 23, 1969. 
13. The Court recognizes and finds that in a proper case, there is a possile cause of 
action in the hands of a remainder-man for waste committed by a sub-tenant. However, in 
this case the Court does not find the facts supporting such a cause of action. 
14. The Court recognizes and finds that in a proper case, a remainder-man of even an 
adjoining landowner might bring a successful action against a person who created unsightly 
scars on a mountain-side and did not rehabilitate the area so as to comply with the 
requirements of law, and thereby might be guilty of the creation of a nuisance which had a 
tendency to suppress local land values of not only the remainder-man but adjoining land 
users and might be declred an unlawful nuisance. Of course, such a theory of action 
requires that the scar on the surface of the mountain be left in violation of law as the law 
then existed and also in violation of the prevailing general standards then in existence. The 
Court, however, in this case does not find that such has been proven, but does in fact find 
that the rehabilitation of the lands in this case was in accordance with the then prevailing 
standards of 1975 in the Davis County area and throughout the general area of the Wasatch 
Front and, therefore, also in accordance with the Judgment of October 23, 1969. 
15. The Court finds no convincing proof that the flooding that has resulted from the 
digging has proceeded outside of the area in which the digging occurred to such an extent as 
to constitute a nuisance or menace to the lands below, unreasonably. 
16. The Court does not find it proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
mined area has been returned to the remainder-man in a wasted or negligently damaged 
condition. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendants have complied with the Judgment of October 23, 1969 and the Davis 
County Excavation Ordinance as applied to this situation. 
2. That Defendants have not done anything to constitute a nuisance, create waste, or 
leave the property in question in a negligently damaged condition. 
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3. The Court should, therefore, enter a Judgment for "no cause for action" in favor 
of both Kenneth F. Walton and Fife Rock Products and Construction Company and 
Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed upon the merits and with prejudice with costs to 
Defendants. 
Let Judgment be entered accordingly. 
DA TED this 27th day of November, 1977. 
A9 
JOHN F. WAHLQUIST 
District Judge 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DA VIS COUNTY 
PAUL F. WALTON, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
KENNETH F. WALTON and 
FIFE ROCK PRODUCTS & 
CONSTRUCTION CONPANY, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 21341 
The above entitled and numbered cause came on for Trial on Monday, Tuesday and 
Wednesday, October 17, 18 and 19, 1977 before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District 
Judge, sitting without a Jury, with Lyle J. Barnes, Esquire, appearing as attorney for 
Plaintiff and Felshaw King, Esquire, and William H. King, Esquire, appearing as attorneys 
for Defendants, and after hearing the allegations and proofs of the parties, and the 
arguments of counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement and the Court thereupon 
having considered at length and deliberated on the evidence presented, the Briefs submitted, 
and being fully advised herein and having made and entered a Memorandum Decision dated 
October 27, 1977 and the said Memorandum Decision finding in favor of Defendants and 
against Plaintiff and the Court having now made and entered its formal Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law consistent with the general conclusions of the said Memorandum 
Decision and having directed that Judgment be entered in accordnce therewith, 
Now, therefore, by reason of said law and findings, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff has no 
cause for action against either Defendant and that Plaintiff take nothing by his Complaint 
and that the same be and is hereby dismissed upon the merits with prejudice with costs to 
Defendants. 
DATED this 27th day of November, 1977. 
All 
JOHN F. WAHLQUIST 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DA VIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL F. WALTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH F. WALTON and 
FIFE ROCK PRODUCTS & 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 21341 
RULING OF THE COURT 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT this matter was heard before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, Judge, sitting at Farmington, Utah, on the 28th day of November, 1977. 
-oOo-
THE COURT: The Court rules as follows: The Court will rule that the basic issue was 
not estoppel. The basic reason for reviewing the planning commission's past activity was to 
establish some attempt to ascertain what the standard was. That's of the day of termination 
of the lease. 
The Court believes, taking this view, the motion to be denied. Estoppel, in the sense as 
used by plaintiff's attorney, was not in issue ever in the trial. 
Insofar as the draft submitted on the King and King stationery, I believe they are 
acceptable to the Court without further change. And they are a little better drafted than the 
Court's memorandum decision, but I believe it to be in conformity therewith. 
Court denies all motions. I will sign the judgment, findings of fact as submitted by 
King and King, and the time for appeal begins thereon. 
-oOo-
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE 
RECORD OF THE RULING TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY. 
Al3 
DEAN C. OLSEN 11-30-77 
C.S.R. 
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